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Message from the Chair 
 
This is a challenging time for us all. For members of APSA’s 
International History and Politics Section, it is especially hard not to read 
utterances, phrases, and political actions without reflecting on past, 
mostly dark, moments in world history. As I write, American officials 
are arresting immigrant ‘criminals’, an elastic term that can include 
immigrants paying taxes and living peaceably—and it can include 
visiting scholars accused of lacking ‘correct’ immigration documents. 
Mexico is proposing legislation that would vastly expand the power of 
the state to arrest, hold for years and more easily prosecute citizens. And 
in Turkey, where there will be a referendum in April to change the 
constitution, Constitutional law scholars are ominously silent because a 
number of famous scholars have been forced to undergo disciplinary 
hearings—some have been fired and some have had their passports 
seized. Kemal Gözler explains the chilling effect on scholars in Turkey: 
 
Everyone has come to a stage where they fear their own 
shadows. Scientists are afraid of their own writing. Authors 
censor their own work. Those who are supposed to write, out of 
fear, either write nothing at all or publish their work in a 
roundabout and self-censored way. Never mind writing an article 
criticizing the government, people have come to a point where 
they even fear writing one or two sentences expressing their 
genuine thoughts on Facebook or Twitter. 
 
With this current climate in mind, I draw your attention to Yale Historian 
Timothy Snyder’s Facebook post and now short book titled Twenty 
Lessons from the Twentieth Century. Snyder’s lessons are those of a 
historian of Central and Eastern Europe; they identify what individuals 
did and what we can now do to protest, hinder and survive moments of 
fascist rule and threats to democracy. 
 
This newsletter includes political science investigations of specific 
historical parallels to today. Deborah Boucoyannis examines parallels 
between past elite taxation scheme and those of today; Thomas Pepinsky 
draws insight from a study of how crises in the West have historically 
reverberated in Southeast Asia; Margaret Peters explores when and why 
businesses challenge or accept xenophobic immigration bills, drawing 
parallels between the Chinese Exclusion Act and current discussions of a 
Muslim ban; Stefanie Walter compares the Brexit vote to earlier 
referenda on disintegration proposals.  
 
 
 
 
 
Special thanks to the Department of 
International Relations at the London 
School of Economics and Political 
Science (LSE) for its financial support 
in publishing this newsletter.  
An organized section of the American 
Political Science Association (APSA) 
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Roundtable 
Drawing on History as We Think 
About the Present: 2016  
 
2016 has been an eventful year. From Brexit to the 
U.S. Presidential elections to events in Turkey, these 
whirlwinds have provided much intellectual fodder 
for scholars of international history and politics. To 
what extent are these events unprecedented? And to 
what extent have we seen this all before? This 
roundtable grapples with these questions in a variety 
of contexts, from medieval populism to late-19
th
 
Century U.S. immigration, from the turbulent 1930s 
in Southeast Asia to the numerous referendums on 
the European project. Together, the following 
contributions demonstrate what historical parallels 
can reveal about the global dynamics of recent 
events. They both flesh out the assumptions that 
underpin these developments and highlight their 
unintended and unexpected consequences.  
 
Populism, Taxation of Elites, and the Origins of 
Constitutional Governance 
By Deborah Boucoyannis, University of Virginia 
 
Perhaps the most used and abused term, not only in 
the U.S. Presidential election but in Europe and 
beyond in 2016, has been “populism.” Invariably 
used pejoratively, the term typically denotes a 
pathology of extremes—as in right-wing and left-
wing populism—where Donald Trump is juxtaposed 
to Bernie Sanders and Spain’s Podemos to 
Hungary’s Fidesz. So it joins together different 
Message from the Chair Continued 
 
This newsletter also includes interviews with the authors of International Order in Diversity: War, Trade and Rule in 
the Indian Ocean and Narrative and the Making of U.S. National Security, which were awarded the Robert L. Jervis 
and Paul W. Schroeder Best Book Award for 2016.  
 
In my opening letter for the last newsletter, where the theme was Women and International Politics, I promised that 
our IHAP program chair would report back on the submissions to APSA, and in particular on all-male panel 
submissions. Here are the overall figures. Our original allotment was for 10 IHAP section panels. Jelena Subotic was 
able to increase overall IHAP participation by creating an “innovative panel of 30-minute presentations” which gave 
us an extra panel to assign. A total of 49 papers and 12 panels were submitted to the IHAP section. Of these, 37 papers 
and 11 panels were accepted. One submission was for an all-male panel. Jelana returned to the organizers, who then 
found two women to include on the panel. By adding women as chairs and discussants, Jelena was able to create a 
distribution of 31 male and 21 female IHAP APSA participants. The distribution of submissions was 62% male, 37% 
female. The distribution of acceptances is 61% male, and 39% female, with the higher acceptance rates for females 
reflecting Jelena’s efforts to create gender diversity on panels. These figures may change once people accept or 
decline the acceptances. 
 
This is James A. Morrison and Joanne Yao’s last IHAP newsletter. We thank them for creating the newsletter and for 
organizing and editing roundtables on Reconceptualizing Empire (Issue 1); an intense discussion of DA-RT (Issue 2); 
Women in International History and Politics (Issue 3); and now this Roundtable on drawing on history to think about 
the present. The newsletter is an important platform for the IHAP section to communicate with its members. Peter 
Harris and Tom Le will be the new co-editors of the newsletter, filling the big shoes left by James and Joanne. 
 
Wishing you all a wonderful spring. I hope to see many of you at APSA. We will once again share our reception with 
the Politics and History section.  Please plan to stop by! 
 
Karen J. Alter 
IHAP Chair 
 
Board Members: 
Keith Darden, American   
Victoria Tin-bor Hui, Notre Dame 
Elizabeth Kier, University of Washington 
Tanisha Fazal, University of Notre Dame 
Stacie Goddard, Wellesley College 
Miles Kahler, American University 
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phenomena: grievances due to economic conditions, 
tax exemptions for the rich, and power concentration 
in elites, with those that stem from resentments of 
different kinds, about loss of status, of ethnic 
homogeneity, and of power. And by doing so, it 
homologizes them. The unifying element in these 
classifications is that “populism” mobilizes an 
artificial construct of “the people” poised against the 
“elites”—an opposition deemed to threaten the very 
foundations of liberal democracy.
1
   
 
However, liberal democracy is a political regime 
formed to give voice and representation to “the 
people” and to erect devices and institutions that 
block power concentration in the hands of “the few.” 
So it is ironic that it now appears “menaced” by 
political movements some of which, nominally at 
least, demand just that. I will argue that the historical 
origins of constitutional governance suggest that 
joining grievances about power and inequality with 
those about status and identity is deeply misguided; 
in fact, it is itself an ideological position that 
threatens liberal democracy. It does this by 
discrediting the type of protest and mobilization that 
is necessary to keep liberal democracy alive, since 
tax exemptions of elites produce the inequality and 
concentration of power that threaten it.
2
 Populism 
consists of exploiting this pathology, but liberal 
democracy depends upon fixing it. 
 
I demonstrate in Populism in Europe and the Americas: 
Threat or Corrective for Democracy? how constitutional 
governance emerged in polities that successfully 
burdened “elites” with regular and high taxation.3 
Where that tax framework failed or never emerged, 
absolutism prevailed. One implication is that when 
economic and power elites escape state control and 
when popular demands that this be reversed are 
discredited as “extreme,” we weaken a necessary 
condition for the preservation of liberal democracy. 
                                                 
1 This is the common element in definitions proposed by two 
illuminating books on the topic: John B. Judis, The Populist 
Explosion: How the Great Recession Transformed American 
and European Politics (New York: Columbia Global Reports, 
2016) and Jan-Werner Müller, What Is Populism? (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016). The latter specifies that 
the term also has “an exclusionary form of identity politics” that 
endangers democracy, a characteristic of right-wing versions. 
2 Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century. 
Translated by A. Goldhammer (Cambridge: The Belknap Press 
of Harvard University Press, 2014); Jacob S. Hacker and Paul 
Pierson, Winner-Take-All Politics: How Washington Made the 
Rich Richer-and Turned Its Back on the Middle Class (New 
York: Simon & Schustser, 2010). 
3 Deborah Boucoyannis, From Roving to Stationary Judges: 
Power, Land, Justice, and the Origins of Representative 
Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
Forthcoming). 
Status competitions, by contrast, weaken the liberal 
democratic compact, although, as much scholarship 
suggests, they are endogenous to the economic and 
political failures I am prioritizing. 
 
Much theoretical and empirical confusion reigns on 
this topic, which has only started to receive in-depth 
scholarly treatment in the light of recent trends.
4
 
This “confusion” stems from the belief that 
complaints about inequality and power 
concentration, when framed in ways described as 
“extreme,” are instead another instance of status 
resentment, of citizens unwilling to come to terms 
with reality.  
 
Most accounts agree that the link between 
inequality, excessive elite privileges and wealth, and 
recession is crucial. Nonetheless, these are often 
treated as background causes which become 
pathologies only when exploited by populist leaders 
through illegitimate methods. Hence, for instance, 
the notion that mainstream leaders need to sustain a 
“difficult balance between responsiveness and 
responsibility,” where popular demands are 
presumed to be irrational and “responsibility” is 
identified with compliance with austerity.
5
 But the 
assumption that, after some basic structural 
realignment, austerity is the responsible route for 
countries like Greece for instance is roundly rejected 
even by the IMF itself. This is a false dichotomy. 
The fundamental problem is too narrow a tax base, 
both through the inadequate taxation of wage 
earners, as the IMF points out, but more importantly 
of elites, whether of the middle class (especially 
professionals) and of the highest economic tier.
6
 
                                                 
4 See the excellent analysis by Justin Gest, The New Minority: 
White Working Class Politics in an Age of Immigration and 
Inequality (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).  
5 Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Populism in 
Europe and the Americas: Threat or Corrective for Democracy? 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012): 102. 
6 Nikolaos T. Artavanis, Adair Morse, and Margarita 
Tsoutsoura, "Measuring Income Tax Evasion Using Bank 
 “Instead, elite taxation means the 
state both possesses the power to 
compel the most powerful actors 
under its jurisdiction and creates 
the incentives that force those elites 
to become more deeply involved 
and committed to the better 
functioning of the state.”  
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Effective taxation of elites is not simply a question 
of fairness. It is certainly not a question of socialist 
ideology and hostility to the free market.
7
 It is also 
not simply a question of inequality and its effects on 
economic development and growth—though this is 
surely central;
8
 it is not an accident after all that the 
two most devastating economic recessions, of 1929 
and 2008, followed the highest recorded levels of 
inequality. 
 
Instead, elite taxation means the state both possesses 
the power to compel the most powerful actors under 
its jurisdiction and creates the incentives that force 
those elites to become more deeply involved and 
committed to the better functioning of the state. 
Absent these conditions, constitutional governance 
begins to unravel.  
 
The hallowed motto, “No taxation without 
representation,” suggests a model whereby 
representation is predicated on social actors being 
powerful enough to withhold taxes and to thus limit 
them. But the first such “bargain” to generate a 
parliament was in medieval England and the power 
balance there was directly inverted: English kings 
were exceptional in being able to both tax and 
extract military service from their elites, compared, 
for instance, to French kings who could only do the 
latter.
9
 The brief decline in royal power during 
Magna Carta obscured the overall advantage the 
English crown retained before and after.  
 
It was this state capacity that incentivized the elites 
to become a regular presence in Parliament. This 
capacity also meant that the state was able to impose 
a uniform jurisdiction, by establishing royal courts 
                                                                               
Credit: Evidence from Greece," Chicago Booth Research Paper 
No. 12-25 (2015). 
7 Adam Smith advocated for the beneficial effects of taxing the 
rich at higher rates. If this and others of his prescriptions were 
followed, inequality would be naturally reduced and a sign the 
free market was working efficiently, not that its rules were 
violated, as we assume; see Deborah Boucoyannis, "The 
Equalizing Hand: Why Adam Smith Thought the Market Should 
Produce Wealth without Steep Inequality," Perspectives on 
Politics, Vol. 11, Issue 4 (2013):1051-1070. 
8 Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, "Is Inequality Harmful 
for Growth?" The American Economic Review, Vol. 84, Issue 3 
(1994): 600-621; Jonathan D. Ostry, Andrew Berg, and 
Charalambos G. Tsangarides, "Redistribution, Inequality, and 
Growth," IMF Staff Discussion Note (2014): 1-30. 
9 Deborah Boucoyannis, "No Taxation of Elites, No 
Representation: State Capacity and the Origins of 
Representation," Politics & Society, Vol. 43 (2015): 303-332. 
 
 
 
 
 
throughout the territory—whilst French and other 
European kings had to tolerate powerful 
jurisdictional immunities held by their nobilities. 
Without such centralization, constitutional 
governance could not materialize: for the regime to 
operate, one needs an obligatory institutional 
framework to implement central decisions in the 
periphery. 
 
Representative assemblies were able to consolidate 
only where the most powerful social actors were 
regular attendees. Where the nobility was not taxed, 
as in France or Castile, it had few incentives to 
sustain central collective bargaining, and the Estates 
eventually withered. This pattern is observed across 
cases, such as Catalonia, Flanders, Holland, the 
Italian city-states, Hungary (and others where 
evidence is scarcer); it also offers new insights on 
different developments occurring in medieval Russia 
and the early Ottoman period.  
 
This relative capacity over the most powerful had an 
important flipside: taxation of the poorest elements 
of English society was lightest, certainly in the 
period of parliamentary emergence (1270s-1330s). 
Until the 1370s, the poorest were exempt from 
taxation.
10
 When higher social strata gained greater 
power and attempted to increase the peasantry’s 
burden through Poll Taxes, the Peasants’ Revolt 
broke out. In the turbulent decades ahead, the 
constitutional practices that were developed in the 
1300s slowly eroded, resulting in Tudor and Stuart 
“absolutism;” this can be directly linked to the 
increasing power of the aristocracy, not least 
through enhanced property tax exemptions. Yet in 
the 1770s, Adam Smith still praised English higher 
per capita taxation because it was not “possible to 
say that any particular order is oppressed,” whereas 
the French were “much more oppressed by taxes 
than the people of Great Britain.”11 What we 
describe instead as “absolutist” and “predatory” in 
the French regime was its imposition of an unequal 
tax burden on the weakest social strata, whilst elites 
were lightly taxed. 
 
Although only suggestive evidence can be given in 
such a short piece, the historical record implies that 
taxation, especially of elites, is an integral part of 
constitutional regimes, not simply for the fairness 
                                                 
10 W.M. Ormrod, Political Life in Medieval England, 1300-1450 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995): 91.  
11 Adam Smith, R. H. Campbell and A. S. Skinner eds., An 
Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations 
Vol. II (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, [1776] 1981): v.ii.k.78. 
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and economic effects it has, but because taxation ties 
the most powerful actors to the strengthening of 
government. Protests seeking to redress fiscal 
imbalances and inequality are not the flipside of 
exclusionary movements based on identity. That 
populists exploit both does not mean that analysts 
 
 
 
 
 should accept their terms. Opposition to the 
concentration of power and the fiscal immunities of 
elites is a necessary condition for the preservation of 
liberal democracy. Moreover, as many scholars have 
pointed out, where this necessary condition is 
fulfilled, status-based concerns can also be contained 
so that they don’t threaten the regime itself. 
 
 
 
The Long Arm of Western Crises 
By Thomas Pepinsky, Cornell University 
 
The events of 2016 represent no less than a crisis of 
democracy and capitalism in the West. Not since the 
1970s have the fundamental pillars of the post-war 
global economic order been so contested, and the 
future course of democracy so uncertain. A 
particular version of nativist populism that combines 
economic grievances with deep suspicion of regional 
institutions is now ascendant from the U.S. to 
Poland and Hungary. The parallels with the 1930s—
also a time of economic hardship, challenges to 
democracy, and skepticism of international 
institutions—are all too evident.1  
 
At present, the focus of debate is mostly local: what 
are the consequences of Donald Trump’s presidency 
for U.S. politics; of Brexit for the U.K. economy; of 
Geert Wilders, Marine Le Pen, Heinz-Christian 
Strache, Frauke Petry, and Viktor Orbán for the 
European project? What remains is geostrategic: 
what is the future of NATO; of U.S.-China relations; 
and of Russia as a Eurasian power? From the 
perspective of global history and politics, what 
interests me are the as-yet unanticipated 
consequences of this crisis beyond the borders of 
Europe, North America, and their great power rivals. 
The West’s political and economic crises tend to 
have long arms; witness, for example, the Latin 
American debt crises that followed from economic 
slowdowns in the U.S. and Europe in the early 
1980s. In the context of the current crisis, what does 
the future hold beyond the borders of the North 
Atlantic community, in particular for the global 
South?  
 
Although 2016 is hardly an exact parallel to 1933, 
the interwar years and their aftermath offer pointed 
lessons for international politics today. To draw out 
                                                 
1 See Adam Plowright, “Back to 1930s nationalism? Historians 
battle over comparison,” AFP, November 22, 2016; Isabel Best, 
“Should we even go there? Historians on comparing fascism to 
Trumpism,” The Guardian, December 1, 2016; Paul Knott, 
“Europe’s peace and democracy can be broken - Brexit is one of 
the cracks,” The New European, December 7, 2016. 
comparative and historical insights on just how far 
the long arm of Western crises can reach, consider 
Southeast Asia, a region far beyond the borders of 
Europe and North America where politics was 
utterly transformed during the interwar years 
anyway. Three features of Southeast Asia in the 
1930s warrant attention: its economic openness; its 
deep engagement with global political ideas; and the 
sometimes peculiar ways in which the 1930s crisis 
resonated with local concerns.  
 
The Downsides of Economic Integration  
 
By the 1930s, Southeast Asian economies were 
deeply integrated into the world economy as 
exporters of commodities from rice and sugar to 
rubber and teak. As export earnings slumped during 
the Great Depression, so too did the flow of 
resources into the region, with dramatic effects on 
politics in the region. James C. Scott’s Moral 
Economy of the Peasant, for example, describes the 
particular conditions of peasant vulnerability in 
colonial economies, and uses these insights to make 
sense of peasant rebellions in the 1930s in colonial 
Burma and Vietnam.
2
 Viewed in international 
perspective, Scott’s peasants were part of a global 
economic system that depended on Western markets 
for export goods, and which suffered intensely from 
the failure of that system.  
 
What effects might a new economic nationalism in 
Europe and North America have on a region like 
Southeast Asia? A West that retreats from global 
economic integration—for instance, with the U.S. 
withdrawing from international agreements such as 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership—will have reneged on 
half a century of advocacy of economic openness in 
the global South. Southeast Asian economies are 
once again deeply enmeshed in global economic 
networks and stand to suffer disproportionately from 
a West that turns away from overseas trade and 
investment. 
 
                                                 
2 James C. Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion 
and Subsistence in Southeast Asia (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1976). 
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Democracy, Capitalism, and Their Critics  
 
Aspiring politicians in Southeast Asia in the 1930s 
were closely engaged with global political currents. 
Sukarno had attended Dutch schools in Java and was 
literate in half a dozen languages, Ho Chi Minh was 
active in Paris and Moscow, and Thailand’s Phibun 
Songkhram and Pridi Phanomyong studied in France 
(Thailand’s last absolute monarch, King 
Prajadhipok, attended Eton). Such experiences 
exposed Southeast Asian elites to ideas that were 
current in the West amidst a time of economic and 
political crisis—about liberalism and its many 
critics, about socialism and communism, about race 
and peoplehood and nationalism. Although 
historians such as John Smail have encouraged 
students of modern Southeast Asian history to 
embrace an “autonomous” history of the region,3 
political currents in late colonial Southeast Asia 
were inextricably intertwined with those in the West. 
They were likewise informed by the growing 
assertiveness of Imperial Japan.  
 
Today, the rise of mass literacy, the rapidity of 
global communication, and the ubiquity of social 
media together means that Southeast Asians 
participate in the West’s political discourse as well. 
Politicians such as Philippine President Rodrigo 
Duterte listen to politicians such as President Trump, 
as do citizens in Manila, Davao City, Singapore, and 
Hanoi. Discourses about economic nationalism and 
national greatness will resonate with many Southeast 
Asians. So too will messages about immigration and 
Islam, although Muslim-majority countries such as 
Indonesia and Malaysia will hear this message very 
differently than will countries with restive Muslim 
minorities such as Myanmar, the Philippines, and 
Thailand.  
 
And much like expansionary Imperial Japan 
provided an alternative political and economic 
model to an inward-looking West, so too will an 
assertive China. Already, Duterte has announced 
that he will seek stronger relations with China, 
telling Chinese leaders that he had “realigned myself 
in your ideological flow” (whatever that means). 
This will mean seeking his own solution to 
simmering tensions over the West Philippine/South 
China Sea and reaching out to investors from China 
who have little interest in even paying lip service to 
good governance. More quietly, China has been 
instrumental in supporting Najib Razak’s 
                                                 
3 John R. W. Smail, “On the Possibility of an Autonomous 
History of Modern Southeast Asia,” Journal of Southeast Asian 
History, Vol. 2 (1961): 72-102. 
increasingly illiberal regime in Malaysia.
4
 
Myanmar’s opening saw the country’s ruling junta 
turn away from China and towards the U.S. Would 
the Trump administration prove an interested partner 
for the National League for Democracy, and would 
China see an opening that would allow for 
reengagement with military interests that retain 
significant power? 
 
Local Inflections 
 
For students of global history, the most interesting 
observation about the 1930s is the unexpected ways 
in which global events and ideas were refracted 
through local social and political concerns. Chinese 
nationalism facing Japanese imperialism would, in 
Southeast Asia, catalyze the emergence of a new 
“local Chinese” identity vis-à-vis titular nationalities 
such as Thai, Vietnamese, and Malay. The prospect 
of economic hardship in a time of trade restrictions 
actually led Filipinos to vote against independence 
from the U.S.
5
 Ideologies that in the Western context 
seemed clearly in opposition would prove to be far 
less so in Southeast Asia: Burma’s Aung San helped 
to found the Communist Party of Burma, what 
would become the Socialist Party of Burma, and a 
nationalist organization that united students, monks, 
and farmers, all in the span of one decade.  
 
Although the current crisis of democracy and 
capitalism will have long arms, local context will 
still matter, with results that may be surprising. How 
                                                 
4 Bhavan Jaipragas, “Has China Offered to Bail Out Malaysia’s 
1MDB? At What Cost?” South China Morning Post, December 
7, 2016. 
 
5 See Thomas B. Pepinsky, “Trade Competition and American 
Decolonization,” World Politics, Vol. 67 (2015): 387-422. 
 
 
 
 “From the perspective of global 
history and politics, what 
interests me are the as-yet 
unanticipated consequences of 
this crisis beyond the borders of 
Europe, North America, and their 
great power rivals. The West’s 
political and economic crises 
tend to have long arms…”  
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will a strategic partner like Vietnam respond to an 
administration that heightens U.S.-Chinese tensions 
without a strong commitment to its regional allies? 
How will a great emphasis on national interests 
resonate in illiberal regimes where the idea of the 
nation itself remains contested? What does anti-
Muslim rhetoric in the West signify for religious 
minorities in plural societies? The answers to these 
questions must remain speculative, but what is 
certain is that local concerns will transform the 
West’s political and economic crisis in unexpected 
ways.  
 
 
The lesson of the 1930s in Southeast Asia is that a 
crisis in the West affected politics everywhere. 
Similarly, what happens today matters everywhere.  
For scholars of international history and politics, the 
implications are clear. At precisely the time when 
we must ask hard questions about democracy and 
capitalism in the West, where national moods have 
turned inward-looking, we must be ever more 
prepared to look beyond our own borders.  
 
 
 
 
Back to the Future: The Muslim ban and the 
Chinese Exclusion Act 
By Margaret E. Peters, UCLA 
 
On January 27
th
, President Trump signed an 
executive order suspending entry of “aliens” from 
countries in which “a foreign terrorist organization 
has a significant presence,” including Iran, Iraq, 
Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen.  Given 
Trump’s previous rhetoric on Islam, most 
commentators have agreed that this order amounts to 
the first step in a Muslim ban even though it does 
not explicitly include a religious test nor does it 
apply to all Muslim majority nations. In this way, 
Trump’s Muslim ban mirrors another shameful 
episode in U.S. history, the Chinese Exclusion Act.   
 
How is it possible that such an unconstitutional and 
discriminatory act could be enacted in modern 
America? Is this simply a sign of an increasingly 
anti-immigrant and xenophobic public? In this 
article, as I argue in my forthcoming book, Trading 
Barriers: Immigration and the Remaking of 
Globalization, it is not the case that anti-immigration 
and xenophobic sentiment has increased but instead 
that pro-business support for immigration has 
declined. Increased trade openness with other 
nations, especially with developing nations, has led 
to the closure of firms in many industries that 
require low-skilled workers—for example, textiles 
or simple manufacturing—that once employed large 
numbers of immigrant workers. The ability to move 
production overseas has allowed other firms to take 
their capital to labor instead of bringing labor to 
capital. Finally, the increased use of productivity-
enhancing technologies has allowed many firms to 
do more with fewer workers. Together, these 
changes in the global economy have decreased the 
number of businesses that support low-skilled 
immigration and decreased the incentive for other 
firms to support it as well. As businesses no longer 
care as much about low-skilled immigration (and to 
some extent immigration in general), politicians, 
especially those on the right that usually cater to 
business interests, have been free to indulge their 
anti-immigration constituents. Here, I will describe 
how a similar process led to the passage of the 1882 
Chinese Exclusion Act and what my argument 
implies for Brexit, Trump’s policies, and the rise of 
the Far Right in places like France and the 
Netherlands.       
 
The Chinese Exclusion Act 
 
The Chinese Exclusion Act, passed in 1882, was the 
culmination of three decades of negative sentiments 
against Chinese immigrants. The act targeted 
Chinese laborers, who accounted for most of the 
immigrants from China. Anti-immigrant sentiment 
against the Chinese arose not long after large 
numbers of Chinese workers first arrived in the 
western United States to work in the gold fields of 
California and on the Transcontinental Railroad. The 
first major outburst of anti-Chinese sentiment 
occurred in 1852-1854 when miners rioted against 
Chinese immigrants in the gold fields. Another 
major outburst occurred in 1867-1869 when miners 
again rioted. The third wave, from 1876-1882, saw 
both workers and small business owners join forces 
to craft the 1882 Chinse Exclusion Act.
1
   
                                                 
1 Terry E. Boswell, “A Split Labor Market Analysis of 
Discrimination against Chinese Immigrants, 1850-1882,” 
American Sociological Review (1986): 352–71; Alexander 
Saxton, The Indispensable Enemy: Labor and the Anti-Chinese 
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I argue that the final wave of anti-Chinese sentiment 
was successful due to increased “trade pressure” 
from firms in the eastern United States after the 
completion of the Transcontinental Railroad in late-
1869. Prior to the railroad’s completion, companies 
on the West Coast were relatively insulated from 
competition with manufacturers in the East. Goods 
from the East Coast had to travel via boat around 
Cape Horn; via boat to Panama, then across land, 
and finally by boat again; or via wagon overland 
across the United States. All three routes were 
extremely expensive, which protected West Coast 
producers from competition. West Coast producers 
also faced much higher labor costs. Even with 
increased immigration from China and internal 
migration from the East, wages for white workers 
were twice the wages white workers received in the 
East. Chinese laborers earned only slightly less than 
Eastern white workers.
2
   
 
Once the railroad was completed, cheap East Coast 
goods flooded into the West Coast and producers 
simply could not compete. Some firms mechanized, 
but many more simply closed their doors, resulting 
in a recession in California.
3
 Workers laid off due to 
the closure of manufacturing firms joined former 
railroad workers, who had been laid off after the 
completion of the railroad, furthering exacerbating 
the already large declines in wages.
4
   
 
This decline in wages likely explains native labor’s 
antipathy towards Chinese workers, but what 
explains why business did not support continued 
immigration from China? The conventional wisdom 
often assumes that firms want open immigration, but 
in this case, firms had little incentive to push for 
continued openness to Chinese immigration. Most 
importantly, firms on the West Coast did not need 
more immigrant labor; the recession and lay-offs 
from the railroad led to great declines in wages.  
Further, larger firms could afford to invest in new 
technology to become more profitable without as 
much labor. Thus, many of the firms that had used 
and supported Chinese labor, including the railroads, 
either did not need the labor any longer or were no 
longer in business. Business leaders, then, chose to 
focus their energies on other issues and ceded the 
playing field to anti-immigrant groups. 
 
I find evidence for my argument in the way senators 
voted on immigration bills during this era (see 
                                                                               
Movement in California (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1971).  
2 Boswell 1986. 
3 Boswell 1986; Saxton 1971. 
4 Boswell 1986; Saxton 1971. 
Figure 1). In the book, I compare the position 
senators took on immigration bills to the percent of 
Chinese immigrant in their state along with an 
indicator for time period. For senators from states 
with high numbers of Chinese immigrants—those in 
the West—I anticipated that they would switch from 
supporting immigration to opposing it after the 
completion of the Transcontinental Railroad. The 
evidence supports this hypothesis and senators flips 
from being pro-immigration to anti-immigration in 
1869 or 1870 at the completion of the railroad.   
 
From the Chinese Exclusion Act to Today: Increased 
Globalization and the Importance of Anti-
Immigration Constituencies 
 
Similar dynamics to those that led to the passage of 
the Chinese Exclusion Act have led to the increasing 
importance of anti-immigration constituencies in 
many developed countries today. Increased trade, 
outward FDI, and increased use of technology mean 
that fewer businesses need low-skilled labor. It is not 
that the businesses still in operation do not want 
more immigration, but just that it is a much less 
important issue for them than it once was. Nor is it 
the case that anti-immigration sentiment has greatly 
increased in the mass public; as Judith Goldstein and 
I have found,
5
 opposition to both low and high-skill 
immigration has decreased since its recent heights 
during the 2008 recession, at least in the U.S.  
Instead, as businesses have closed or pulled back 
support for immigration, policymakers, especially 
those on the right that often cater to business, can 
indulge the worst sentiments of their anti-
immigration base.     
 
It is dynamics like these that have allowed UKIP, 
Donald Trump, Geert Wilders, and Marine Le Pen to 
run on anti-immigration platforms without facing 
(much) backlash from business groups. It is only 
now, after businesses are discovering that this 
rhetoric hurts them in the global competition for 
talent, that they have voiced their opposition. 
Unfortunately, this dynamic is unlikely to change. 
As globalization leads to further deindustrialization, 
businesses will be even less likely to support low-
skilled immigration and it is likely that we will see 
further limits to immigration. 
 
                                                 
5 Judith L. Goldstein and Margaret E. Peters, “Nativism or 
Economic Threat: Attitudes toward Immigrants during the Great 
Recession,” International Interactions, Vol. 40, Issue 3 (2014): 
376–401. 
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Figure 1. How Senators Voted on Immigration, (1865-1914). Coefficients and 95 percent confidence intervals from OLS 
regression of proportion of votes for open immigration on  the percent Chinese foreign-born interacted with indicator for time period. 
Pre-time period is the coefficient on  percent Chinese foreign-born (dashed 95 percent confidence interval) from 1860 to the year 
listed and Post- time period is the coefficient on  percent Chinese foreign-born interacted with time period indicator (solid 95 percent 
confidence interval) for all years after the year listed until 1945. Regressions also include senator and year fixed effects and linear 
time trend. 
  
The Brexit Referendum and the Mass Politics of 
Disintegration 
By Stefanie Walter, University of Zurich 
 
On 23 June 2015, British voters plunged the 
European Union (EU) into its biggest crisis to date 
by voting in a popular referendum that Great Britain 
should leave the EU. Referendum-induced crises are 
not new to European politics. The European 
integration process has been challenged and at times 
blocked by popular referendums in the past—for 
example when the Danish voted against the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1992 or when France and the 
Netherlands dealt the death blow to a European 
Constitution in 2005. 
 
The Brexit referendum is different from these earlier 
referendums, however, because it has challenged an 
existing international institution, rather than slowing 
down or stopping efforts to integrate further. 
Whereas most referendums have been called to 
intensify integration by ratifying international 
treaties that establish more cooperation, the Brexit 
referendum was about rolling back international 
cooperation. As such, the Brexit referendum is an 
example of a rare, but increasingly relevant type of 
referendum: a disintegration referendum.  
 
Disintegration referendums either aim at 
withdrawing from existing international institutions 
(which I term “abrogation referendums”) or at not 
complying with elements of such an institution 
(“non-compliance referendums”). Examples for 
abrogation referendums include, not just the Brexit 
referendum, but also the 1975 British referendum on 
remaining in the European Community (EC), 
Greenland’s 1982 referendum on leaving the EC, the 
1986 Spanish referendum on remaining a NATO 
member, and the 2014 Swiss ECOPOP referendum, 
which called for a strict limitation of immigration 
and the termination of any international treaties that 
conflicted with that goal. Non-compliance 
referendums include the 2000 Brazilian referendum 
about continuing an ongoing IMF program, the 2014 
Swiss referendum on the popular initiative Against 
Mass Immigration, the 2015 Greek bailout 
referendum, and the 2016 Swiss implementation 
initiative. Figure 2 shows that such disintegration 
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referendums, although still rare, have become much 
more frequent in the 2010s. Five of the nine 
disintegration referendums held so far were held in 
the 2010s, and considering that populist leaders 
across Europe have called for more disintegration 
referendums, this number may continue to grow. 
 
Integration and disintegration referendums share 
many commonalities, but differ in three key 
respects: the outcomes of a cooperative/non-
cooperative referendum vote, the costs of a non-
cooperative referendum outcome to other states, and 
the strategic dilemma a referendum in one country 
creates for other countries involved.
1
  
 
First, in terms of outcomes, a cooperative vote in an 
integration referendum establishes new forms of 
international cooperation along previously 
negotiated lines, whereas the country reverts to the 
status quo in the case of a non-cooperative 
referendum outcome. In a disintegration referendum, 
however, a cooperative vote preserves the status 
quo, whereas the outcome of a non-cooperative vote 
is rather uncertain, because it strongly depends on 
whether the other members of the international 
institution accommodate or punish the referendum 
country’s unilateral wish to leave or change the 
institution. In the Brexit referendum, for example, a 
vote to remain in the EU would have led to a 
continuation of Britain’s membership in the EU (the 
status quo). The non-cooperative “pro-leave” vote, 
however, has opened a vast range of potential 
outcomes including everything from a UK freed 
from EU contributions, regulations, and 
interventions, but with continued access to the single 
market, to a UK trading with the EU only on WTO 
terms. Contrasting this with the 2005 No in the 
French and Dutch referendums on the EU 
Constitution, for example, it is clear that the range of 
                                                 
1 Stefanie Walter, Elias Dinas, Ingnacio Jurado, and Nikitas 
Konstantinidis, Non-cooperation by Popular Vote. Expectations, 
Foreign Intervention and the Vote in the 2015 Greek Bailout 
Referendum (Bern: PEIO Conference, 2017).  
possible outcomes was much smaller in those 
instances than in the Brexit case.  
 
Second, in terms of costs, what both integration and 
disintegration referendums have in common is that 
the consequences of a non-cooperative popular vote 
are not limited to domestic voters, but also have 
negative ramifications for other countries. The main 
costs of failed integration referendums are that 
potential gains from cooperation cannot be realized. 
In contrast, a successful disintegration referendum, 
i.e. a unilateral decision not to comply or to 
withdraw from international cooperation, not only 
destroys existing gains from cooperation, but also 
carries political contagion risks that can put the 
long-run viability of the entire international 
institution at risk. All this means that the stakes are 
particularly high in disintegration referendums not 
only for domestic voters, but also for foreign voters 
and governments. The costs of Brexit to the other 
member states, for example, include, among many 
other things, the loss of London’s contributions to 
the EU budget, a potential loss in exports and 
economic ties between the UK and EU countries, 
loss of free access to Europe’s financial center, the 
loss of free movement of people to the UK, and 
uncertainty about the future of EU residents living in 
the UK. In addition to these economic costs come 
political ones, such as the reduced geopolitical 
power of an EU-sans-UK and the fear that the Brexit 
example may encourage other countries to call 
referendums on their EU membership as well, 
leading to an unravelling of the EU. 
 
Third, in deciding how to respond to a successful 
disintegration referendum, other countries face a 
dilemma between accommodating and punishing the 
referendum country for wishing to selectively not 
comply or to exit an existing international 
institution.
2
 Accommodation means that they grant 
the referendum country exceptions from certain 
rules or try to keep the ties as close as possible even 
after a formal exit of the referendum country, in the 
process salvaging as many of the cooperation gains 
from the existing arrangement as possible. But this 
strategy carries the risk of creating moral hazard and 
political contagion. The alternative is punishment, 
such as the termination of the entire cooperative 
                                                 
2 To be sure, failed integration referendums in the past have also 
presented the other countries with the dilemma of whether to 
accommodate (i.e. renegotiate the agreement in question with 
better terms for the referendum country) or to punish (i.e., move 
ahead without the referendum country). But the dilemma is 
much more pronounced in the case of disintegration 
referendums.  
 
 “Five of the nine disintegration 
referendums held so far were 
held in the 2010s, and 
considering that populist leaders 
across Europe have called for 
more disintegration 
referendums, this number may 
continue to grow.”  
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arrangement in the case of a non-compliance 
referendum or a hard line of no compromises in 
negotiations about the terms of exit in the case of an 
abrogation referendum. The advantage of the 
punishment strategy is that they make non-
compliance and exit costly and hence are likely to 
discourage similar referendums in the future 
amongst other member states, but the downside is 
that it is costly for everyone involved because many 
gains from cooperation are destroyed. Once more, 
the Brexit example illustrates this dilemma nicely. 
While granting the UK continued access to the EU’s 
single market would maintain existing economic ties 
and hence preserve many cooperation gains for the 
other member states, the remaining EU-27 member 
states are weary that such a strategic response might 
put the entire European project at risk in the long run 
by creating incentives for other countries to defect as 
well. In contrast, the punishment strategy might 
dampen others’ incentives to defect, but would come 
at a high economic price for both Britain and the 
remaining member states. Which route the 
remaining EU members will take continues to be a 
hotly debated issue in the UK to this day. 
 
Although the role of mass publics has been 
acknowledged with regard to the creation of 
international agreements, voters’ ability to shape or 
terminate international cooperation once an 
agreement has been signed has traditionally been 
limited. Only recently have voters begun to 
challenge existing international institutions at the 
ballot box. The potential of domestic voters to 
terminate international agreements unilaterally poses 
new challenges and questions for international 
cooperation. Reflecting the increasing dilemmas 
domestic voters face between the gains from 
international cooperation, democracy, and national 
sovereignty
3
, popular movements aimed at 
disintegration are likely to keep the world occupied 
for some time to come. 
                                                 
3 Dani Rodrik, The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the 
Future of the World Economy (New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 2011). 
 
 
Figure 2. Foreign-Policy Referendum Types, 1970-2016
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The 2016 IHAP Award Winners  
Every year the IHAP section awards The Robert L 
Jervis and Paul W Schroeder Best Book Award and 
the Outstanding Article Award. In 2016, the award 
committee (Jonathan Kirshner (chair), Stacie 
Goddard, Eric Grynaviski) struggled to pick a 
winner. They decided to award the prize to two 
books: International Order in Diversity: War, Trade 
and Rule in the Indian Ocean by Andrew Phillip and 
Jason Sharman and Narrative and the Making of 
U.S. National Security by Ronald R. Krebs.  
The Outstanding Article Committee (Henry Nau 
(Chair), Hyon Joo Yoo, Jeff Colgan) essentially 
concurred in that they awarded the Outstanding 
Article Prize to an article version of Phillips and 
Sharman’s book  “Explaining Durable Diversity in 
International Systems: State, Company, and Empire 
in the Indian Ocean,” International Studies 
Quarterly, Vol. 59 (2015): 436-448.  
The committee also singled out for an honorable 
mention Michael Beckley’s excellent article “The 
Myth of Entangling Alliances: Reassessing the 
Security Risks of U.S. Defense Pacts,” International 
Security, Vol. 39, Issue 4 (2015): 7-48. 
The IHAP newsletter team interviewed the authors 
to investigate the processes which led to these award 
winning books.   
Andrew Phillips and 
Jason Sharman are joint 
authors of International 
Order in Diversity: 
War, Trade and Rule in 
the Indian Ocean which 
shares the 2016 IHAP 
Best Book Award. 
Their joint article based 
on the book also won 
the 2016 IHAP Best 
Article Award.  
Andrew received his 
doctorate at Cornell 
University and is an 
Associate Professor at 
the University of 
Queensland’s School of 
Political Science and 
International Studies. 
Jason received his PhD 
from the University of 
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and is currently at the 
University of Cambridge as the Sir Patrick Sheehy 
Professor of International Relations. A summary of 
their book is available on the publisher’s website.  
1. How did you become interested in the 
intersection between international history 
and politics? How did you become interested 
in your particular project?  
Jason: My undergraduate honors thesis and Ph.D. 
dissertation were at the intersection of comparative 
politics and history, looking at state-society relations 
in the Soviet Union and Communist Eastern Europe. 
For me, it was a tough decision whether to do my 
graduate studies in political science or history. In 
line with trends in the field, I moved away from the 
study of Eastern Europe and history more generally 
towards contemporary international political 
economy and IR theory, but I always had a side 
project or two on the go with a more historical bent. 
Teaming up with Andrew and benefiting from his 
experience in writing macro-history enabled me to 
foreground historical work. 
Relating to our project on the international system 
stretching from East Africa to East Asia in the early 
modern period, the opportunity to study this history 
was just too tempting to pass up, both in terms of the 
history itself, and the larger implications for IR 
theory. This was especially so given that the greater 
Indian Ocean region has been almost completely 
ignored by IR. But without a theoretical rationale for 
the study, in this case largely provided by Andrew's 
thoughts on international systems comprised of 
diverse rather than like units, there would not have 
been a point of entry. 
Andrew: I actually started off my undergraduate 
degree aiming to be a history major! Fatefully, 
however, I took Chris Reus-Smit’s course on 
International Political Economy halfway through the 
second year of my degree. Misleadingly badged, the 
course was actually an introduction to the literature 
on state formation, international systems and 
historical change. From that point on, I was hooked 
on studying International Relations through a 
historical lens and have been ever since. 
I came to this particular project in part as a natural 
progression of my existing research program on the 
comparative study of international systems, and 
partially as a result of the opportunity to collaborate 
with Jason in an area where our interests intersected. 
Following my first book, War, Religion and Empire, 
I had a decent understanding of international orders’ 
Andrew Philips 
Jason Sharman 
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historical evolution in East Asia and Western 
Europe. But I was intrigued with what must have 
been happening in the area ‘in between’, especially 
in the era preceding Western colonial dominance. 
Fortunately, Jason was also interested in studying 
international relations in the Indian Ocean, so the 
project naturally evolved from that starting point. 
2. How did you navigate the tension between 
detailed historical research and macro 
theoretical claims; between contingency and 
generalizability?  
Jason: During my Ph.D., I was fortunate enough to 
do a couple of graduate history courses (again Soviet 
history), which really brought home to me the 
differences between history and political science as 
academic disciplines. My language skills were 
nowhere near good enough for proper historical 
research, and I couldn't see myself spending 
sufficient time in the archives to succeed as a 
historian. More positively, political science gives 
more freedom to roam around and wrestle with 
different big questions, as the sunk costs of any one 
research program are lower. 
In our particular work on the early modern Indian 
Ocean, neither of us ever laboured under the 
delusion that we were going to out-historian the 
historians. We were never going to learn Portuguese 
or Dutch, let alone Mughal Persian or other Asian 
languages, for example. But we thought we could 
certainly make a contribution to IR scholarship, 
which seems to have strangely neglected the initial 
centuries in which Europeans and the powers of the 
Indian Ocean littoral interacted on a basis of rough 
equality, in terms of how international systems 
comprised of diverse units work. Furthermore, 
though historians come at them in a different way, 
they are also interested in big, comparative 
questions, and so it's possible that our study may 
make some modest contribution to the history of the 
region also. 
Generalizability is largely in the eye of the beholder. 
If we were studying U.S. Congressional mid-term 
elections from 1994 to 2014, I doubt we would have 
faced the generalizability questions we did, even 
though this just is one country over two decades. But 
studying a huge region comprising dozens of polities 
over three centuries is regarded as a very niche, 
obscure topic. This double-standard is unscientific, 
and the fact that it persists in the field shows the 
triumph of aesthetics and parochialism over 
objective, scientific principles in political science. 
Andrew: With great difficulty! 
The challenge of navigating between macro-
theoretical claims and detailed historical research is 
inescapable when studying the evolution of 
international systems over time, indeed arguably for 
all historically-informed IR research. 
To reinforce Jason’s observations, one of the ways 
we sought to navigate this was by always ensuring 
that the larger theoretical puzzle of the project (in 
our case, explaining durably diverse international 
systems) remained our lodestar. Correspondingly, 
we were quite ruthless in ensuring that we engaged 
the historical material with this overarching goal in 
mind. 
It is always tempting to read as deeply as possible 
into historians’ debates, and indeed one of the most 
exciting challenges of doing historical IR is the 
intellectual stretching that comes with striking out 
into the unfamiliar territory of specialist 
historiography. With that said, neither Jason nor I 
are trained historians. We lacked both the language 
skills and ready access to archives that would be 
required to make precision-guided interventions into 
historical debates on the basis of exhaustive primary 
historical research. And in any case, the kind of 
argument that we were trying to make—in the realm 
of IR theory and the macro-historical study of 
international systems—is intellectually distinct from 
the kinds of puzzles historians are focused on, and 
requires a different balance between the general and 
the specific.   
Ultimately, I don’t think there is a one-size-fits-all 
answer to the question of balancing contingency and 
generalizability, and balancing theoretical and 
historical considerations. It depends in the last 
instance on the kind of puzzle you are asking and the 
audience you hope to engage. Some of the best 
historically-informed IR work of course does 
involve exhaustive immersion in primary material, 
whereas other projects lend themselves to a different 
approach. The adage that you should ensure the 
method/approach serves the question rather than 
vice versa remains as true in historical IR as 
elsewhere.  
3. What was the most challenging aspect of 
working with the historical material? 
Jason: For me, I had almost no knowledge of the 
history of the Indian Ocean region when we started 
(despite having grown up and done my 
undergraduate degree in Western Australia, i.e. on 
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the shores of the Indian Ocean). I had a vague idea 
the Mughals had something to do with the Taj 
Mahal. Though I had read a lot of history, it was 
very focused on Europe. It took a couple of years of 
reading to get a basic familiarity with hitherto 
unknown polities, though this process was definitely 
fascinating and very enjoyable. It's a privilege to 
have a job that lets me decide that I want to stop 
working on money laundering and tax havens for a 
while (my other research focus), and follow my 
interests to research something completely different. 
How many other jobs let you do something like that? 
Andrew: For me, the most challenging part of 
working with historical material is knowing when to 
stop reading and when to start writing! 
As I have found for my other historical IR projects, 
the initial engagement with new historical material 
always induces a powerful (at times almost 
overwhelming) sense of intellectual vertigo. This 
was especially the case for this project, given that 
Jason and I were both relative neophytes when it 
came to studying the Indian Ocean region. 
While we were always clear on our puzzle and our 
preferred temporal scope for the project (roughly 
1500-1900CE), this still left a great deal of material 
to cover, and a range of important historiographical 
debates within which we had to orientate ourselves. 
One great advantage of collaboration is that you can 
(to a degree) engage in an intellectual division of 
labor to manage the immersion process, at least in 
the initial theory formation and rough drafting 
phase. 
With that said, I’ve always found it challenging to 
determine at what point I am sufficiently familiar 
with the historical material to risk venturing a rough 
first draft. For this project, I found the discipline 
internal to the project itself (a clearly bounded 
theoretical puzzle) and the discipline inherent in 
working with a collaborator as super-productive as 
Jason to be supremely valuable in ensuring that 
immersion in the historical material did not become 
paralyzing submersion.  
4. What was the most unexpected thing you 
found in conducting your historical research? 
Jason: Knowing in the abstract that IR and the social 
sciences more broadly are Eurocentric is one thing, 
but actually carefully studying non-Western histories 
really brought home to me how warped the field has 
been, and largely remains, conceptually and 
empirically. I was stunned by how puny the 
European powers were in the early modern period 
compared to polities like the Ottomans, Mughals, 
and Ming and Qing Chinese. For a field that claims 
to be all about the great powers, the continuing 
neglect of non-Western great powers, and non-
Western international politics in general, speaks 
volumes about the field's real priorities. 
Andrew: Echoing Jason’s thoughts, this project 
dramatized for me the late and limited character of 
Western dominance in Asia, and the extraordinary 
magnitude of Asian Great Powers relative to their 
comparatively puny Western counterparts, at least 
up until the 19
th
 Century. 
In Australia especially, pundits and policy-makers 
are currently transfixed by the decline of Western 
dominance and the supposed advent of the “Asian 
century.” For me, a great take-away from this 
project is that Western observers (especially at the 
popular but to a degree at the academic level too) 
falsely exaggerate the degree and duration of 
Western dominance in world politics. This means 
our historical base-line for what is the ‘normal’ state 
of affairs in IR is often seriously distorted. Many of 
the supposedly novel features about the emerging 
world order—its multi-centric character, the 
prominence of Afro-Asian agency, the existence of 
plural, hybrid and partially overlapping world-views 
and institutions—were clearly present albeit in 
different forms throughout the early modern period. 
In considering relations in the Indian Ocean before 
Western dominance, I hope our research will prompt 
greater scholarly interest in engaging with historical 
instances of diverse international systems to make 
sense of today’s resurgent complexity. 
5. Few scholars who work in international 
history and politics work collaboratively. 
What are some of the positives and negatives 
of collaboration? Would you recommend that 
more scholars pursue collaborative work? 
Jason: Certainly the collaboration with Andrew has 
been fantastic; I definitely could not have done the 
project alone, both in terms of the big theory ideas 
but also the sheer volume of reading and historical 
material. I also had a similarly productive 
collaboration with John Hobson on another 
historical piece when we were both at the University 
of Sydney. 
Of course collaboration is a means to an end rather 
than an end in itself, and certainly one hears horror 
stories of collaborations gone wrong. People have 
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different styles of work, and of course these may 
complement each other or clash. But in the context 
of the increasing marginalization of qualitative work 
in IR, including historical IR, I think scholars 
working in the area of international history and 
politics need to think harder about collaboration and 
do more joint and co-authored work. 
Andrew: For me, collaborating with Jason was a 
fantastic and uniformly positive experience—and 
I’m not just saying that because he’s likely to read 
this! There are many great positives entailed in 
collaborative research, some general and some more 
specific to historical IR. 
On the general front, I found collaboration an 
invaluable antidote to the isolation that can 
sometimes accompany academic research. One of 
the greatest things about collaboration is that you are 
constantly sharing and testing your ideas with your 
co-author at every stage of the project, rather than 
waiting until you have your first draft to solicit 
feedback from colleagues and reviewers. This means 
that half-baked ideas can be shot down early, rather 
than persisting and mutating to debilitate fully 
worked-up draft manuscripts. Likewise, it is much 
more fun going back and forth refining promising 
ideas with someone who is equally immersed in the 
project, rather than relying on more impressionistic 
engagements with colleagues who—however 
brilliant and generous—remain removed from the 
project itself. 
I also found the collaboration process to be 
especially useful in divvying up the immense body 
of material entailed in macro-historical IR research 
projects. For the Indian Ocean project, Jason and I 
initially divided up our cases, Jason working more 
closely on the Portuguese and Dutch East India 
Companies, me focusing on the English East India 
Company, and the two of us giving roughly equal 
attention on the Mughals. This initial division did 
not absolve either of us from fully engaging all of 
the cases over the full duration of the project. But it 
did make the initial deep dives into the historical 
material more manageable, ensuring smooth early 
progress on the project. 
I hope and anticipate that we will see greater 
collaborative work in historical IR in the future. 
There is already a great deal of terrific collaborative 
work out there, ranging from wonderful co-authored 
studies like Barry Buzan and George Lawson’s 
Global Transformation, through to great edited 
volumes like Joel Quirk, Shogo Suzuki and Yongjin 
Zhang’s volume on early modern international 
relations. 
As the field recognizes the importance of moving 
towards a more global and less Eurocentric historical 
IR, I expect there will be even greater need and 
demand for collaborative historical IR projects, not 
least because of the value of assembling research 
partnerships and teams that combine specialist 
language skills (enabling engagement with non-
English secondary and primary sources) with top-
shelf theoretical innovation. I look forward to 
reading the resulting masterpieces!   
6. What advice would you offer to more junior 
scholars interested in working at the 
intersection of international history and 
politics? (Consider, for instance, the best 
advice you received in the past or the advice 
you wish you might have received).  
Jason: My take would be that although I find 
international history and politics fascinating, it is not 
an easy path in terms of basic milestones of 
professional advancement like getting a job, getting 
tenure and getting promoted. Outside a relatively 
small community, the field is really not that 
interested in history, or at least is only interested in 
history in a very instrumental, utilitarian way of 
asking what lessons we can draw from history to 
apply to politics today. In this context, it is really 
important to have a very strong theory rationale for a 
historical project. The “who cares?” question will 
loom large for historical projects, so my view is that 
the theoretical rationale has to be front and center to 
answer or pre-empt this objection. I foolishly 
ignored advice from my dissertation committee 
along these lines and had quite a tough time on the 
job market as a result. 
Andrew: Keep your audience in mind! I am 
sometimes struck by the pessimism some scholars 
(both senior colleagues as well as ECRs) regarding 
the presumed marginality of historically informed IR 
within the discipline. My own view is that this 
pessimism is misplaced, and that there remains a 
strong appetite for historical IR, both in its 
traditional bastions (stereotypically the 
Commonwealth), as well as in communities (e.g. the 
U.S.) which are sometimes wrongly perceived as 
having entirely embraced quantitative approaches. 
That said, this project has reinforced for me Jason’s 
insight—that to find a broad audience for your 
research through publication in prominent IR 
venues, it is essential that you conceive the project 
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from its earliest stages with a clear theoretical puzzle 
in mind that is likely to speak to broader concerns in 
the field. 
The reality is that the specifics of your empirics are 
unlikely to resonate with more than a small 
community of fellow enthusiasts in the IR 
community, given the unfamiliarity of many in our 
field with (especially pre-1945) international history. 
That said, interesting theoretical puzzles will always 
engage a larger general readership, so be sure to 
front-end this in your research. Doing so will not 
only maximizes your publication chances (and thus 
your chances of actually having your research read), 
but will also assist in disciplining your reading 
strategy, making for a less overwhelming and more 
rewarding research experience overall.  
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Ronald R. Krebs’ book 
Narrative and the Making 
of U.S. National Security 
shares the 2016 IHAP 
Book Award. Ron received 
his PhD in Political 
Science from Columbia 
University and is currently 
the Beverly and Richard 
Fink Professor in the 
Liberal Arts at the 
University of Minnesota’s Department of Political 
Science. A summary of the book is available on the 
publisher’s website.  
1. How did you become interested in the 
intersection between international history 
and politics? How did you become interested 
in your particular project?  
Narrative and the Making of U.S. National Security 
began as an effort to make sense of the politics of 
the War on Terror. The September 11 attacks took 
place as I was completing my dissertation, and the 
United States invaded Iraq during my first semester 
teaching Introduction to Global Politics. Like most 
scholars of international relations, I opposed the war 
in Iraq, and I was particularly puzzled why it was so 
hard to find leading politicians forthrightly 
challenging the Bush administration’s march to war, 
why the questions even war opponents posed were 
commonly so narrowly formulated, and why you 
almost never heard deep criticism of the War on 
Terror itself in establishment circles. I concluded, in 
what I thought at the time was a one-off piece in 
Security Studies, that you could not explain the 
march to war in Iraq without explaining how a 
particular post-9/11 narrative of national security 
had become dominant and how, once dominant, it 
had set the boundaries of legitimate policy debate 
and tilted the tables. That, in turn, led me to wonder 
about when and how particular narratives of national 
security rise to dominance, when and how their 
dominance erodes and debate broadens, and what 
the consequences are for foreign policy. Relatively 
little of Narrative directly addresses the War on 
Terror, and the book examines numerous key 
debates over 70 years of U.S. foreign policy. But its 
origins lie in my struggle to make sense of the 
politics of our time. 
In college, I had been a (rather untrained) historian 
of U.S. foreign policy, and I entered my doctoral 
program in political science with a very limited 
background in international relations theory and 
with little understanding of what I was getting 
myself into. So I’ve always been a bit of a frustrated 
diplomatic/international historian, and I’ve always 
been at least a bit ambivalent about the field of 
international relations’ aspiration to generalization 
across space and time. Narrative reflects that deep-
seated ambivalence—in its aspiration to identify 
general mechanisms and dynamics and in its 
appreciation of historical contingency.  
2. What was the most challenging aspect of 
working with the historical material? 
Different kinds of engagement with historical 
materials involve different sorts of challenges. In the 
past (as well as in current research), I’ve worked 
with archival materials in multiple countries, and I 
was familiar with the peculiar challenges of crafting 
historical accounts based on declassified government 
documents. In portions of Narrative and the Making 
of U.S. National Security, I worked with historical 
materials in what was, for me, a brand a new way 
and which presented new challenges.  
The second half of Narrative explores the ups and 
downs of the Cold War consensus. The conventional 
view is that the Cold War consensus was a set of 
beliefs, sincerely held by the vast majority of U.S. 
elites and by most common citizens as well, that 
underpinned a militarized, unselective global 
containment. No surprise then that they sought to 
track the consensus via policy dis/agreement, 
congressional voting patterns, and public opinion. 
But I thought this had the Cold War consensus 
wrong. I understood it to be a dominant narrative to 
which U.S. elites felt compelled to adhere in their 
public pronouncements, regardless of their private 
qualms. And so I turned instead to a longitudinal 
content analysis of editorials on foreign affairs 
between the end of the Second World War and the 
dissolution of the USSR. These editorials were 
drawn from two leading newspapers that inhabited 
opposed poles on the ideological spectrum, 
especially on foreign affairs: the consistently 
internationalist and liberal New York Times and the 
reliably nationalist and conservative Chicago 
Tribune. I had human coders complete a fourteen-
point questionnaire on each editorial, with additional 
double-blind coding to establish intercoder 
reliability. In the end, the database contains nearly 
9,100 editorials. 
Parts of this project felt methodologically familiar. 
To develop the questionnaire and coding guidelines, 
I had to “soak and poke”—immersing myself in 
debates from each era and drawing out the typical 
formulations that signaled, say, whether the speaker 
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thought the superpowers’ interests were entirely 
conflicting (zero-sum), largely overlapping, or 
somewhere in between (mixed-motive). To explain 
the puzzles the content analysis generated, I 
employed more conventional, process-tracing 
methods of particular episodes in the political 
history of U.S. foreign policy. 
But it presented two challenges that, to me, were 
novel. First, the project was of such a large scope 
that there was no way I could read all the editorials 
myself. The archival researcher does not trust 
anyone else’s reading of the documents. Here, I had 
no choice. I could, and did, train my coders, and all 
went through two rounds of harmonization, in which 
they brought their codings of a set of “test” editorials 
into rough alignment. But I couldn’t prepare them, 
for instance, for the snarky Tribune editorials in the 
1950s, whose meaning was nearly the opposite of 
what they said. And while I could, and did, spot 
check their codings, I could do that for only a very 
limited subset of the corpus. Second, and related, I 
had to accept that the codings would not fully align, 
that due to the interpretive demands of the coding, 
intercoder reliability would be lower than ideal, and 
that there might well be far too many disparities in 
the coding to resolve. This too is at odds with the 
archival researcher’s imperative: to get it right and 
to keep digging until you’ve gotten it right.  
Finally, and perhaps most frustrating, all this work 
was merely preliminary. The content analysis 
recorded an empirical pattern, but it is otherwise a 
“dumb” method: it does not tell the analyst whether 
these patterns are puzzling or expected or how to 
make sense of the data. After three years of time-
consuming, expensive work with multiple teams of 
research assistants, the hard intellectual lifting was 
still to come. 
3. What was the most unexpected thing you 
found in conducting your historical research? 
I didn’t think that scholars had in the past properly 
conceptualized or studied the Cold War consensus. I 
nevertheless started in with the presumption that 
they had gotten its basic propositions and 
periodization right. As a result, I tried at first to 
perform the content analysis in Part II of Narrative 
on the cheap—by conducting it on just a small 
number of years that prior scholarship had suggested 
marked the key moments of change. When my data 
in those years didn’t reflect the expected changes, I 
knew that (a) I was on to something and (b) I had a 
lot of work ahead of me, as I had no choice but to 
conduct the content analysis over the full span of the 
Cold War.  
I did not embark on this project expecting that it 
would be historically revisionist. But I show in Part 
II that the Cold War consensus, or dominant Cold 
War narrative, was substantively narrower than 
previous accounts had suggested (revolving only 
around representations of the communist adversary), 
had come together later (well into the Korean War), 
and had eroded earlier (well before the 
Americanization of the Vietnam War, let alone the 
Tet Offensive, when most Americans turned against 
the war) and that a new consensus narrative had 
ironically taken shape in the waning days of 
Vietnam, in the early 1970s, revolving for the first 
time around representations of the self—of 
America’s mission in the world. This historical 
revisionism gave rise to theoretical revisionism—as, 
to make sense of these puzzling dynamics, I 
developed a counterintuitive account of the 
relationship between policy failure and success and 
narrative change. 
4. What advice would you offer to more junior 
scholars interested in working at the 
intersection of international history and 
politics? (Consider, for instance, the best 
advice you received in the past or the advice 
you wish you might have received).  
First, embrace the unexpected. If Narrative has an 
impact, it will be because the research turned up 
evidence that was at odds with my initial 
assumptions—and, perhaps too slowly (though in 
ways expected by cognitive psychologists), I 
eventually reconsidered and rejected those 
assumptions. 
Second, remember that history is not just theory’s 
proving ground: it is generative of theoretical 
puzzles. Most theoretical insights rest on a 
convoluted, iterative process combining induction 
and deduction. Don’t be dispirited when history 
doesn’t fit your theory. It just means that there’s 
another puzzle worth your grappling with. 
Finally, consider carefully if your project is 
tractable. Narrative is not the sort of project I could 
have done for my dissertation or as a junior faculty 
member. It required too many financial resources 
and took far too much time. Be ambitious—but 
remember that, when a discussant says your work is 
“ambitious,” what they are often implying is that 
you have failed to deliver.  
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Upcoming Events and Workshops 
 
 
MARCH 2017 
International Symposium: US-Russian Relations in 
Global Context 
March 16
th
- 17
th
: Kennesaw State University 
Kennesaw, Georgia, USA 
More Information 
 
Hallsworth Conference on China and the Changing 
Global Order 
March 23
rd
-24
th
: University of Manchester 
Manchester, UK 
More Information 
 
Society for Applied Anthropology 77
th
 Annual 
Meeting: Trails, Traditions and New Directions 
March 28
th
-April 1
st
: La Fonda on the Plaza Hotel 
Santa Fe, New Mexico, USA 
More Information 
 
 
 
 
APRIL 2017 
MPSA 75
th
 Annual Conference 
April 6
th
-9
th
: Palmer House Hilton 
Chicago, IL, USA 
More Information 
 
Political Studies Association 2017 Conference 
Politics in Interesting Times 
April 10
th
-12
th
: University of Strathclyde 
Glasgow, United Kingdom 
More Information 
 
Southwestern Social Science Association Annual 
Meeting: Social Science and Social Change 
April 12
th
-15
th
: Hyatt Regency 
Austin, Texas, USA 
More Information 
 
(UAA) 47th Annual Conference of the Urban 
Affairs Association 
April 19
th
-22
nd
: Hyatt Regency Minneapolis Hotel 
Minneapolis, Minnesota, USA 
More Information 
 
European Public Choice Society Annual Meeting 
April 19
th
-22
nd
: Central European University 
Budapest, Hungary 
More Information 
 
 
2017 Annual Conference New York State Political 
Science Association 
April 21
st
-22
nd
: Nazareth College 
Rochester, NY, USA 
More Information 
 
ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops 
April 25
th
-30
th
: University of Nottingham 
Nottingham, UK 
More Information 
 
 
JUNE 2017 
4
th
 European Workshops in International Studies 
June 7
th
-10
th
: Cardiff University 
Cardiff, UK 
More Information 
 
BISA 42
nd
 Annual Conference 
June 14
th
-16
th
: Jurys Inn Brighton Waterfront 
Brighton, UK 
More Information 
 
ISA International Conference 2017:  
The Pacific Century?  
June 15
th
-18
th
: Hong Kong University 
Hong, Kong, China 
More Information 
 
ISA CISS Conference: Cooperation and 
Contestation in World Politics 
June 28
th
-30
th
: University of Bologna 
Bologna, Italy 
More Information 
 
 
 
JULY 2017 
ISA GSCIS Workshop: Exploring the Local in 
International Relations  
July 6
th
-8
th
: University of Havana 
Havana, Cuba 
More Information 
 
12
th 
International Conference on Interdisciplinary 
Social Science: Cross-Cultural and Global Research 
as Interdisciplinary Practice 
July 26
th
-28
th
: International Conference Center 
Hiroshima, Japan 
More Information 
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SEPTEMBER 2017 
113
rd
 APSA Annual Meeting & Exhibition: 
The Quest for Legitimacy 
August 31
st
- September 3
rd
: Hilton Union Square 
San Francesco, CA, USA 
More Information 
 
ECPR General Conference 
September 6
th
-8
th
: University of Oslo 
Oslo, Norway 
More Information 
 
11
th
 Pan-European Conference on International 
Relations: the Politics of International Studies in an 
Age of Crisis 
September 13
th
-16
th
: Universitat Pompeu Fabra 
(Ciutadella Campus) 
Barcelona, Spain 
More Information 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
